Models and Embodiment in Buddha Dharma

 Justin Whitaker has posted a blog Imposing (and Uncovering) Models on Buddhism  on July 16 that raises some interesting questions about models and embodiment.  The context is about how some people think we are imposing Western models onto Buddha Dharma in the process of the transplantation and acculturation of the Buddha Dharma to the West. Whiaker points out the question of models is fundamental to our ability to understand reality and how we view the most basic issues such as our body and our embodiment in reality. He also raises a question about whether the idea of rebirth is based on a model constructed by observations of seasons. Of course that question itself is based on a Western model of analysis.

Here's my initial response.

Well, I imagine that the very idea that the "Four Noble Truths" might be a "model" is very controversial among some Buddhists, whom I would call "fundamentalist" in their view of this question.  One of the essential points of the Mahayana Ekayana (Great Vehicle One Vehicle) view of Buddha Dharma is that all verbal teachings are at best only models and as such are skillful expedient means of teaching Buddha Dharma and as expedient means they are not to be mistaken for Buddha Dharma itself.

As for rebirth, I think it is an intellectual error by the so-called "trusted scholars" to reify it into some kind of seasonal origination.  The notion of rebirth comes from the actual psychic experiences of meditators, mystics, and shamans. To discount this as if rebirth is just a philosophical deduction from observing seasons is a bias imposed by the model of Western materialism.  If a person has not experienced past life recall, then there is no basis for another person to speculate as to how that recall is experienced.  That is, rebirth is not based on any kind of objective study or observation of nature and extrapolating that into a model, but is based on memory itself, the memory of past lives that arise in the deepest meditation and most profound mystic experiences. 

Scholars are notoriously stupid when it comes to understanding transmundane, transcendental, or depth experiences. It would be far more fruitful to look at the archetypal psychology of Carl Jung (including his diary of his own depth experiences in the recently published Red Book) to understand the origins of rebirth as arising from the psychic field and not from such things as objective considerations of the seasons.

I agree wholeheartedly (which is a word-model worth exploring) that the question of embodiment is essential to the Buddha Dharma.   The body-map or body-model that we construct in our consciousness is essential to out illusion of self-image.  We can see this starkly evident in what is known as the "phantom limb syndrome."  Even whn a limb is lost we can still believe it is there and still "feel" it. This shows us that the embodied nature of our lived experience is very largely constructed by our body mapping and that what goes for our body mapping equally goes for our world mapping.  The construction of our body-view and our world-view together make up the construction of our self-image and our delusional belief in the model of a separate self. 

Meditation is an effective way to melt the constructed body-view of our self-image that is embodied as our body-map.  It is sometimes said that the body contains or stores memories, but from the other view it is memories that construct and store the body.  The True Body is the body that is not determined by "inside and outside," "self and other," etc. Buddha taught that the True Body is "pure" because it is not affected or contained by the mundane notions of "purity and impurity."   That is, we don't "become pure" by cleansing the mind of its defilements, the True Body is inherently pure because it is not stained by dualistic concepts like purity and impurity. 

So "cleansing the mind of defilements" means seeing through the mind's constructtion of models that are based on the inherent dualistic or polarizing structure of consciousness.  We are able to have a world view, a body map, and a self image, that is any and every kind of model, exactly because of the polarizing function of consciousness that constructs the model out of the oppositions of the mind's sensations, perceptions and mental formations.  Cleansing the mind of defilements doesn't mean becoming pure without impurity, but in seeing that there is no model of purity that does not necessarily rely on impurity for its construction.

Response to “Zen Has No Morals!”

7/9/2012
by Gregory Wonderwheel

I found Christopher Hammacher’s article titled, “’Zen Has No Morals!’ - The Latent Potential for Corruption and Abuse in Zen Buddhism, as Exemplified by Two Recent Cases,” to be interesting and drawing in my attention, as well as being both provocative and evocative.   And it also has severe limitations and shortcomings.

A personal note as a caveat lector: about 30 years ago to test myself in public speaking, I entered an “open mic” warm-up competition for amateurs at a local pub that was hosting a tour of a comedy competition for semi-pros.  I wrote my own script and as part of my act I introduced myself as a Zen Buddhist. I said something like, “You know Zen, right?  People sit around and call that cultivating the truth.  Yes, it’s a cult, sure, but it's the cult that is able to laugh at itself.” Not too many people got it, but one of the touring comedians came up to me afterwards with kind words saying while my routine was over the heads of most of the alcohol swilling audience, he got it and thought is was intellectually funny.  I hope the reader can get it too.  While I think Hammacher is erroneously calling Zen a cult, I’m not righteous about my disagreement.  As I see it, fundamentally any organization of three or more people who are cultivating something together as a joint project is, generically speaking, a cult, and as such, also potentially a patient of the cult syndrome disease.  

Section 3 is the bulk of the Hammacher’s paper, comprising 28 of the total 44 pages.  In this Section of “Analysis of Behavior,” Hammacher presents eight characteristics of the syndrome of cultic behavior and supplies examples of behavior for each of the characteristic symptoms for each of the two targeted persons who are the subjects of the paper.  This is Hammacher's strongest Section and to me Section 3 is the baby in the bathwater that should not be thrown out with the bathwater of the following sections.  The 8 factors are important measuring sticks for evaluating the presence of organizational dysfunction, as well as interpersonal dysfunction on the individual level. 
Not just Zen groups, but every organization can benefit by a discussion of these 8 items and how they relate to the group's communication and interpersonal dynamics:  a) Aggression upon being confronted; b) Extreme formalism; c) Blaming the student's ego; d) Hypocrisy; e) Groupthink; f) Information control; g) Self-aggrandisement or “cult of personality"; and h) Autocratic institutional control.

It seems clearly evident that the behaviors listed for each of the 8 issues are fairly attributed.  So I agree with Hammacher’s later observation in the Section 5 Summary “that cult dynamics might have played a significant role in both groups,” that is, the Zen Studies Society and the Mumon-Kai, however I would even go further and remove the polite use of the word “might.”  I’m not an apologist for Eido Roshi.  But “cult dynamics” alone does not make an organization a cult, because the specific symptoms of cult dynamics may be present in dysfunctional organizations that are not cults.  

In my view, the paper is lacking in several important areas. For instance, in Section 4, the “Discussion,” the logic is weak and the argument conclusory and unsound and there is no discussion of the differential diagnosis between “cultic symptoms” and the symptoms of organizational “founder’s syndrome” which can be easily mistaken for each other. Also, in omitting a minimum of contextualization that may be provided by Zen itself the paper severely criticizes “Zen” without inviting or letting “Zen” respond and speak for itself.    Essentially, the Discussion section is missing discussion that is not presupposed and prejudiced, and the whole paper is presented without acknowledgement of the legitimacy, history, or purpose of the enterprise of Zen.  In other words, the paper is established on a false premise (i.e., a false view of Zen), presented from the materialistic view of the perspective of cultic critique, and does not provide an unbiased view that sees, much less even acknowledges, any other orientation than its own, and  most of Hammacher’s arguments are actually of the straw man variety.   Therefore, I specifically do not agree with, and specifically reject, Hammacher’s conclusion at the end of Section 4, “that the structure and teachings of Zen Buddhism itself lie at the root of the problem.” 

In general, the idea that the structure and teachings of Zen Buddhism itself lie at the root of the problem, if true, would mean that every Zen sangha expresses the cultic syndrome.  This is patently false.  In a paper like this, if his criticism is not to be taken as a blanket criticism of Zen, it is incumbent on Hammacher to provide critical distinctions between the cultic groups he is targeting and the normative groups that he is not.  It is extremely insufficient for him to try to cover over this crucial issue with a “Note Bene” of two sentences: “Though this paper is quite critical of two specific Zen teachers, it is not my intention to suggest that the reader should avoid Zen Buddhism at all costs. The practice of Zen meditation has in fact been very beneficial to me personally, and I leave it up to readers to judge its overall merits for themselves.”  Here he merely mentions that his attack on two teachers of Zen Buddhism and their sanghas should not be taken as an attack on Zen meditation, yet his conclusions are specifically including Zen as an institution and therefore all Zen sanghas. Thus, this feeble attempt to protect “Zen meditation” as the baby in the bathwater fails, because as a practical matter there is no Zen meditation outside of the Zen sangha.   If every Zen sangha is an institution at root that will grow into a cult, then Zen meditation itself must also share the same cultic root.  Again, this is a false conclusion.

The orientation of Hammacher’s premise is the same as the kind of critical studies that claims “religious wars are examples of what is wrong with religion.”  However, that people fight wars in the name of religion has nothing to do with the cause of the wars or the legitimacy of the religion: wars have to do with the personal and archetypal orientations to and influences of power which can infiltrate any organization of humans.  That the institution can be hijacked by people who are more concerned about social power relations than the practice of the religion does not make the religion illegitimate.  Similarly, that the social dynamics of the two targeted Zen sanghas were hijacked as institutions and succumbed to the institutional illness of cult syndrome has absolutely nothing to say about the health of other sangha institutions of Zen Buddhism, and partly because there is no single homogenous institution of Zen Buddhism.

Hammacher presumes that “The unspoken assumption in Zen has always been that the meditation alone naturally freed the accomplished practitioner from life's moral quandaries, without the need for rigid rules of conduct imposed from above.” Yet this is a false premise. The presumption shows a lack of understanding of Zen as a tradition.  That people in the West may have come to Zen with wrong intentions and met with Zen teachers who mirrored those confusions is a psycho-social dynamic, not an institutional one. The cultic institution is built up within the influence of the psychological field to protect the structure of the power relationships, but the structure of the power relationships is not inherently Zen.  In other words, Hammacher has completely missed the analysis of the cultic syndrome independent of the particular institution in which it arises. 

As to Hammacher’s claim, there is, in fact, no “unspoken assumption in Zen” that meditation alone naturally frees us from life’s moral quandaries.  Of course, there are Zen practitioners in the West and the East with that delusional assumption but the assumptions of confused people are not the assumptions “of Zen.”   For example, Hammacher reports that Eido Roshi wrote, “If they want to be moralistic vigilantes let them do what they want. But my Dharma stream of Hakuin, Torei, Gempo and Soen is slightly different. You know when I say slightly, I mean very.”  Hammacher doesn’t inquire into the veracity of this statement and takes is at face value as a Zen statement.  However, anyone familiar with the words of Hakuin and Torei know the supreme value and ultimate virtue they placed in Great Compassion and the Four Great Vows.  As Torei tells us: “The strength of the vow is founded on Great Compassion. Those who seek from selfish motives only attain to a shallow insight... Truly, truly, Great Compassion is the origin and foundation of becoming a Buddha.”
To the extent that the words or behavior of Eido Roshi and Dr. Zernickow are incongruent with Great Compassion, then they are deviating not only from Hakuin and Torei but also from the foundation of Zen Buddhism and Zen’s actually spoken assumptions.  I don’t know anything about Dr. Zernickow other than what Hammacher presents, but based on the information that Hammacher provides, there is no basis to consider Zernickow to be a representative of Zen in the first place.

In Section 4, Hammacher suggests six potential causes leading to the phenomenon of otherwise intelligent or reasonable Zen students accepting such flagrant misconduct: a) Lack of morality; b) Japanese authoritarianism; c) Impossible ideals; d) The Absolute vs. the Relative; e) The institution of dharma transmission; f) Emphasis on enlightenment; and g) Cultic tendencies.  Hammacher discussion of these six points is conclusory and based on superficial presumptions and analysis. 

Hammacher posits that Zen has a “lack of morality” and that Zen “does not explicitly condemn any of the behaviour in question.”  Of course, he says this in the context of having already presented Aitken Roshi’s explicit condemnation of the behavior in question as well as the condemnation of others’ involved in Zen.  The confusion that Hammacher perpetrates and perpetuates here is the scholarly fiction that there is such a thing as “Zen” that exists independently of Zen practitioners.  The illusion of Zen having or lacking morality is a convenient one for critics and supporters both, but it is people who have or lack morality, not Zen, and it is people who condemn or praise, not Zen.  Even if it were to be said that we could know what “Zen” does or does not condemn by a survey of what a majority of Zennists condemn, Hammacher has not even pretended to determine what the majority or the mainstream of Zen practitioners or Zen teachers opine on the question. In effect, Hammacher doesn’t have a clue what Zen condemns or praises.  Likewise, he doesn’t appear to have a clue what the view of morality is from a Zen perspective of no-perspective, which is certainly not a rationalization of immorality under the pretense of amorality.  In Hakuin’s system of koan inquiry, the consideration of the Precepts as koans is the ultimate sequence of koans to be formally reviewed.

As for the question of the causative effect of Japanese authoritarianism, Hammacher makes a good point about the necessity of differentiating a cultural attitude of authoritarianism with the practice of Zen, but he then again says that one will not find in Zen any condemnation of the negative cultural elements.  And again, he asserts this while at the same time admitting that there is awareness of this issue among Zen teachers in the West.  Determining this differentiation is among the most interesting issues of Zen’s transmission to the West.

As for “impossible ideals,” it is the nature of all ideals to be “impossible.”  There is an old saying that ideals are like the stars, we can guide our lives by them but don’t expect to reach them.  The allegation that Zen practice “actually promotes some of the behaviour in question” is ludicrous.  

First, Hammacher alleges that Zen has the “utopian ideal of ‘egolessness’” which is in reality impossible to achieve. If “egolessness” is an ideal, then of course it is impossible to achieve, but is “egolessness” even a Zen ideal?  I say no.  Hammacher confuses the question of being aware of the role of ego in suffering with the question of what to do about it.  I have never heard of a Zen teacher advocating “egolessness” in any way even remotely like a literal ideal.   To see that the ego is an illusion is not at all the same as saying live life without an ego.  Every living Zen teacher in the west that I have encountered either personally or by recording or book makes clear the distinction of seeing through the illusory and empty characteristics of the ego’s self-image and the realization of every day life as a human being.  

It is not just the Zen student who tends “to blame herself and her own practice for her less-than-perfect behaviour,” everyone does that. Such self-blame is an integral part of our suffering and is part of what spurs people to practice any religious or spiritual journey.   .Again, Zen teachers all acknowledge the activity of self-blame and the various ways that we create infinite regressions of rationalization in trying to deal with it. No bona fide Zen teacher encourages students to achieve “perfect behavior.” Indeed, on the one hand Hammacher criticizes Zen for not demanding moral perfection and then on the other hand says Zen demands the perfection of egolessness.  The grain of truth here is that an orientation to morals as rules does have a direct connection to self-image, and that seeing our true nature does mean inquiring into the literalization of morals and the self-aggrandizement with which we stick our thumb into the morality pie and pull out a plum and say “What a good boy am I!.”  When Huineng said “Don’t think good or evil, at that time what is your original face?” he was not advocating anything to do with behavior or conduct that is amoral. He was teaching an advanced Zen practitioner about how to view.  Huineng distinctly taught repentance as a prerequisite to Zen practice and stated that the two aspects of true repentance are the confession of past wrongdoings and the remorseful vow to not commit the same wrongs in the future. 

The teaching of “The Absolute and the Relative” is one of the most profound and difficult teachings of Zen.  This scheme of the Absolute and the Relative is a sequence or series of five relationships between the absolute and the relative.  The series is called the Five Ranks or Five Positions of the Absolute and Relative, Monarch and Minister, Real and the Apparent, etc.  In the system of koan inquiry established by Hakuin, the Five Positions are the penultimate sequence of koans before the final sequence of considering the Precepts as koans.  Unfortunately Hammacher portrays this deeply essential issue in the simplistic terms of an antagonistic dichotomy and labels it “The Absolute vs. the Relative”” as if the two were engaged in a lawsuit or divorce.

So when Zen students, whether beginning or senior, espouse a “view of the ‘Absolute’ as different from the ‘Relative’” as Hammacher portrays, it is another example of a straw man argument presenting a misunderstanding as if it were the Zen view.  Any attempt to manipulate “the relative,” i.e., dualistic view of opposites, on the basis of “the absolute”, i.e., the nondual view, is by definition a mistake of categories type of argument.  If a Zen teacher tries to rationalize or justify his or her own bothersome behavior and conduct on the basis of “all imperfection is perfect” then either the Zen teacher’s words are misunderstood or the teacher is teaching error.

Such teaching of error should not be confused, as Hammacher seems to do, with the teaching of the nondual Dharma of Zen.  That is “responding to questions posed from the relative point of view of everyday life with answers coming from the Absolute perspective of Buddhism - and vice-versa.” is useful as a skillful means to demonstrate the limited understanding of the questioner.  Whether it is in practice a useful and skillful means or simply self-serving manipulation depends on the context, i.e., the mind set, and the setting, of the exchange.  Hammacher’s logical proposition--that from the “absolute” perspective there is no individuated self to feel suffering, therefore one can easily conclude that, ultimately, no abuse can ever occur—is based on a false premise that the absolute perspective destroys or eliminates the relative perspective.  Instead, Zen teaches that the absolute perspective transforms the relative perspective, so that what was previously perceived as an opposition, i.e., Hammacher’s “vs.”, is seen with the wisdom of equality as unified in such a way that the multiplicity and differentiation of reality is perceived without the illusion of separation.  Therefore, the person who has realized the transformations of the Absolute and the Relative and so manifests the Great Complete Mirror Wisdom and the Wisdom of Equality could not subscribe to the cockeyed claim that “no one betrays anyone”  when the truth is that the betrayer, the betrayed and the betrayal are unified. That is, if anyone is betrayed then so too is Buddha betrayed.  Anyone who uses the lame argument that there is nothing to judge or no one to judge in order to justify abusive behavior is by definition not presenting a Zen perspective.

The institution of dharma transmission does present a difficult area for Western students to understand.  In Western culture we have to look back to the master and apprentice or protégée models of education.  The apprenticeship model of education does have its negative aspects, but in fact every system of education has its negative side.  The apprentice has to earn the master’s approval and many guild masters did treat their apprentices as slaves and made them subject to abuse.  There is nothing particularly unique or different from the apprentice model about the potential for abuse by Zen teachers and their students. 

However, the idea that the institution is abusive because of an inherent power differential is as silly as claiming that a Zen teacher as a perfected individual is the best friend of everyone that is met.  If a Zen teacher holds himself or herself out as the sole means to salvation, then that person is to be avoided. It is just wrongly short sighted and one sided to hold that Dharma transmission is “actually a matter of institutional authority.”  Saying so is to miss the picture as if a commentator on baseball were to say that pitching is “actually a matter of skeletal dynamics” and ignore all the rest of it.  As for its aspect related to institutional authority, Dharma transmission confers teaching certification, nothing more.  But that is not the only “matter” of Dharma transmission. However, no one should equate Dharma transmission with “nigh-divinity” and Zen teachers do not as a rule do so as Hammacher suggests they do. Even the most awakened Zen teacher, may not be the best or even a good teacher of Zen.

The “Emphasis on enlightenment” is a causative factor in the student’s misunderstanding only to the degree that the student misinterprets “enlightenment” and holds it to be the teacher’s approval.  Students who participate in a Zen interview (sanzen) with the Zen teacher with the expectation that the teacher can bestow enlightenment on them are students who have not been paying attention.  However the teacher cannot just ignore these students and must find some way to respond appropriately.  Generally, the responses are various ways of leading the student to independence from the teacher.  The emphasis on enlightenment simply means keeping one’s eyes on the prize. 

Hammacher is incredulous that a Zen teacher may even be considered “as being both ‘enlightened’ and a sexual abuser at the same time.”  This shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the term “enlightened” that seems to be shared by both Eido Roshi’s uncritical supporters and Hammacher.   One of the essential teachings of Zen is that the meaning of words is not in the definitions.  For example, the meaning of love is not in the multiple and varied definitions of love, but the multiplicity of definitions points to the fluidity of the meaning of love.  Likewise, enlightenment is not one thing; it is not even a thing at all.  It is indeed true that a person may enlightened to some regard, yet the person is still human and may behave badly, even delusory, or commit sexual abuse.  This is a concept that some people find it impossible to understand because they do not see past the oppositional views. To see that an enlightened person can still fall into karmic entanglements does not mean the same thing as forgiving a shortcoming because it is “perfectly compatible per se with the goal of ‘fully awakened’ Zen practice.”    The shortcoming is perfectly incompatible with awakened Zen practice and if forgiveness is appropriate, it is based on the incompatibility, not on an imagined compatibility.

The enlightenment of Siddhartha Gautama is placed on the highest pedestal imaginable and indeed some people do see Shakyamuni Buddha with “nigh-divinity” or even greater than divinity, as he was called the Teacher of Humans and Devas (i.e., all heavenly beings including Gods).

It is one of the greatest weaknesses of Hammacher’s paper that he advocates that the Zen community turn to sociology, psychology, or philosophy to learn something from Western methods, yet this paper is devoid of psychology.  The analysis is purportedly sociological but is more akin to political.  To understand how the emphasis on enlightenment Influences our working with a Zen teacher (or any spiritual teacher) we must open the inquiry into the psychological field that Freud called the transference and Jung preferred to call projection.  We simply cannot adequately understand how an otherwise intelligent Zen student can lose their good sense without looking at the psychological dynamics of the teacher-student relationship in terms of the meaning of enlightenment as this is the most intense field of projection that a human can experience. 

The framework of Hammacher’s paper is the concern for “Cultic tendencies”.  However, he completely ignores the necessity of a differential diagnosis with the very similar organizational dysfunction known as “founder’s syndrome.”  Hammacher’s list of cultic tendencies is virtually identical to the list of founder’s syndrome tendencies.  A strong argument can be made that what Hammacher has actually identified is founder’s syndrome in the two organizations and that the so-called institution of Zen Buddhism is not really involved.  For example, one of the most important indicators of a cult is missing: that is the enforced isolation of members. While ZSS may rightly be characterized as exhibiting group-think, that is also a characteristic of founder’s syndrome.  The differential diagnosis of cult syndrome requires an additional symptom that the group think is enforced physically by the physical restriction of the members from the outside world.  I see no allegation that such behavior, for example physically restricting contact with family members, occurred at ZSS.  This is an important and essential watershed symptom necessary for the determination that the organization is a cult in the intended negative connotation of the term.  An organization suffering from founder’s syndrome is cult-like, especially in developing and maintaining the “cult of personality” in the leader, but that does not make it “a cult.”  

The one diagnostic symptom mentioned by Hammacher that might suggest the targeted organizations are cults is the issue of “excessive mind-altering practices.”  However, this highly subjective issue is not per se determinative of a cult.  All spiritual practices are mind-altering practices; otherwise they could not be called spiritual practices.   The question revolves on the meaning of “excessive” and on the valance of voluntariness of the context in which the excessiveness is encountered.  Attending a sesshin with so-called excessive practices is entirely voluntary. There is no entrapment involved.  The sole enforcement mechanism is peer pressure.  By this definition, the excessive behaviors enforced by peer pressure in high school would make all high schools snake pits of teenager cults. 

Before concluding that a Zen practice center is a cult, it is necessary that a thorough analysis of the mind-altering practices be made in terms of their efficacy and risk-benefit.  Olympic athletes typically subject themselves to excessive training practices. Does this make the Olympics a cult?

Another factor is whether the people who left required deprogramming upon leaving in order to better adjust to society free of the cult.  Since there is no uniform post-cult trauma, this is not a determinative factor by itself, but it is one of the symptoms that appears to be missing at least with ZSS.  Also, with any reports by persons who have left an organization the reporter’s role as either an apostate or leave taker must be determined in order to have a clear perspective on the report.  Apostates typically have an apostate narrative in which they use a “captivity story” that emphasizes their entrapment, manipulation, and victimization.  Apostates typically discredit the stories of voluntary leave takers who do not employ a victim narrative and who take responsibility for their leave-taking sometimes without condemning the organization other than saying it was not what they were looking for. Hammacher has not only failed to adequately clarify the distinction between cults and founder’s syndrome, but he has failed to adequately identify the inner dynamics of cults themselves and to employ even a modicum of critical analysis as to the informants he relies upon and failing to distinguish between apostates and leave takers..

Hammacher’s conclusion that “if only some of the many allegations against Shimano and Zernickow are true, there still can be no significant differentiation between such “dharma-transmitted” Zen Buddhist masters and other, more run-of the-mill gurus and cult leaders.” does not stand up to scrutiny. There are very significant factors of differentiation between the usual lineup of cult leaders like Jim Jones, Sun Myung Moon, L. Ron Hubbard, and David Koresh, just to name a few, and a Zen teacher like Eido Roshi.  If Hammacher sees “no significant differentiation” then he is just blind, and this kind of hyperbole undermines his credibility.

While Hammacher has identified cult-like aspects and tendencies in the targeted organizations, he has failed to demonstrate that they are cults and not just organizations suffering with founder’s syndrome or some closely related disorder.  By relying on his inadequate analysis and misleading discussion of cults, Hammacher’s allegations against Zen Buddhism “as an institution” fail.  Certainly we can agree or disagree on a case by case basis whether there is or is not organizational dysfunction, but there is no basis to agree that the vast majority of Zen sanghas are exhibiting cultic tendencies.  The acculturation of Zen in the process of transplantation to the West will continue to occur over the next couple of hundred years.  Organization experimentation is ongoing and will continue. 

Take care and cherish it.
_/|\_

What is knowing?

Someone asked,

"What is Knowing? It seems that knowing is not the same to everyone. I know, you know yet there exists so many shades of differences. What is the reason for this?"

The knowing that is the same for everyone is the same, but everyone overlooks the knowing that is the same because we create differences in our imagination and call that which we imagine the different kinds of knowing.  Zen is about not being beguiled by the differences of our imaginations and realizing the true knowing that is the same for everyone, because that is the solitary brightness of the true person without rank.

In his Introduction to the Collection of the Various Expositions of the Fountainhead of Zen (sometimes translated with the shortened title Introduction to Chan or Chan Prolegomenon), Zen Master Guifeng Zongmi writes (in my translation):

Question: Above you already said that nature on its own is “completely constant knowing.”  Why is it necessary for the various Buddhas to open and indicate it?

Answer: That which is this word knowing is not indeed the knowing of evidence.  It means to articulate the true nature that is not the same as the vast sky, a tree, or a rock.  Therefore I said knowing.  Neither is it like the conditional and objective discriminations of consciousness, nor like the shining essence of complete penetration of wisdom. It just is the one true suchness of nature autonomously and constantly knowing.

[For comparison here's Jeffrey Broughton's translation from Zongmi on Chan, p. 135:  

Question: Above you have spoken of the “complete and constant Knowing that is intrinsically [pure from without beginning]’” Why should it be necessary for the buddhas to open it up and show it?

Answer: This Knowing is not the knowing of realization. My intention was to explain that the true nature is not identical to the sky or a tree or a stone, and, therefore, I said “Knowing.” [Knowing] is not like the consciousnesses that take sense objects as objective supports and discriminate. It is not like the wisdom that illuminates substance and comprehends. It is just that the nature of thusness is spontaneously constant Knowing. ]

So Master Zongmi is making very important points about the knowing that is the common ground of beings.

"That which is this word knowing is not indeed the knowing of evidence."

It is not the knowing that is discovered by evidence, proof, testimony, demonstration, etc.  This is very hard for us to see, but it is essential. We always grasp onto knowing by the content of what is known that we think we can amass and put on our mental shelf as knowledge.  We learn something by the evidence and call that knowing. But this is not the kind of knowing that Zongmi calls knowing.

"It means to articulate the true nature that is not the same as the vast sky, a tree, or a rock."

To talk about knowing is to clarify our true nature. The sky, tree, and rock do not articulate true nature and have not need to clarify true nature. We do.

"Neither is it like the conditional and objective discriminations of consciousness,"

Zongmi makes it clear that the knowing he is talking about is not the knowinng of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, or cognitive consciousness (vijnana) of the six consciousness. This kind of knowing by the six consciousnesses is dependent on the activity of the conditional objective discrimination of consciousness (vijnana). This is the knowing that is more basic that the testimonial knowing of knowledge, as it is the knowing of perception. However, most of us erroneously think that this is true knowing. We think that perception of color is knowing. We think that perception of sound is knowing.  Zongmi reminds us that true knowing is not to be confused with discriminations of consciousness.

"nor like the shining essence of complete penetration of wisdom."

Here, Zongmi is making the Zen point that the true knowing is not even the penetrating wisdom of prajna.  Prajna is the realm of the sages, bodhisattvas and Buddhas.  Zongmi is saying that the true knowing is not this type of wisdom, but is the knowing that is the inherent knowing of both commoners and sages, sentient beings and Buddhas. If knowing was the purview of sages and Buddhas, then that knowinng would be a knowing of accomplishment and as a knowing of acomplishment it could not be the innate knowing of true suchenss.

"It just is the one true suchness of nature autonomously and constantly knowing."

This knowing is shared by everyone. This is the knowing indicated by the Zen phrase "ordinary mind is Buddha." But because we confuse this knowing of true suchness, this "ordinary mind," with ordinary perceptions, objective consciousness, knowing about things, penetrating wisdom, etc, Zongmi has given us the examples of these categories of mistaken notions of "ordinary mind" and "knowing."

The knowing that we should know is the knowing that is just the one true suchness of our own true natue.  Because it is autonomously and constantly knowing, such words as "non-action" and "unconditioned" are applied to it and it is said that it cannot be gained by seeking. This is the conundrum.  It is autonomous and constant knowing, yet we don't know this knowing becasue we are distracted by our own objective discriminations that analyze and divide this one suchness into kinds of knowing and unknowing.

Monotheism means there is only mind.

A questioner asked:

I was reading about it from the wikipedia.

"Ahura Mazda's creation—evident as asha, truth and order—is the antithesis of chaos, which is evident as druj, falsehood and disorder. The resulting conflict involves the entire universe, including humanity, which has an active role to play in the conflict."

"Zoroastrianism (as well as later Manicheism) may still have influenced elements of Buddhism, especially in terms of light symbolism."

"Daena (din in modern Persian) is the eternal Law, whose order was revealed to humanity through the Mathra-Spenta ("Holy Words"). Daena has been used to mean religion, faith, law, and even as a translation for the Hindu and Buddhist term Dharma."
It seems Zoroastrianism may have a significant influence in both Buddhism in China as well as well as Judaism and Christianity in the west.

Interesting stuff... Would be interested to hear thoughts from others :)

To me, it seems like everyone wants to say their own religion influenced the others.  It may be a historical truth that Zoroaster/Zarathustra was a prophet in the time of 1400 BCE but to the extent that Zoroasterian themes crop up in other cultural areas is not indicitative of cultural transmission per se.  I don't see any direct linkage with Buddhism but there is a case to be made for overt cultural cross polliination and influence of Zoroasterian themes in the development of Jusaism and Christianity.

The cultural archeology is interesting, but to me the psychological archeology is far more fascinating. But for those interested in the cultural anthropology, here's a link for an interesting story about the Zoroastrian roots of Judaism's monothesim and Paul's Mithraic version of Christianity as being essentially an heretical Christianity.   

In my view, the importance of "light" as an image for "awareness" transcends any particular culture and is inherently deep and profound in the psyche/mind. I'm using the term "psyche/mind" to mean the Mind only (cittamatra) of the Lankavatara. 


In other words, every culture gets the meaning of light as the symbolic image for the essence of our existence without any need to imagine cultural transmission.  Even physics has come to the conclusion that "light" is the essence of the universe, that everything is stardust, and light is just another way of saying energy which is the vibration that is reality. 

From the Buddhist perspective, the "problem" with the usual interpretation of Zoroastrianism (and all three of the great religions of the Lavant that appear to have been influenced by Zoroastrianism) is that it does not escape the literalization of good and evil.  The objectification of the idea of truth and falsehood is the activity of the 6th and 7th consciousnesses working together to close the veil of the source of mind.   The drama that is then created is a childish fantasy that the veil can be reopened by a victory of the good over the evil.  In fact the very investment in that drama is the glory of Mara because that is an endless loop of conflict with infinite regression.   The self-glorification of humanity by positing a "special" role in that conflict by playing the crucial role of aiding the good to overcome the evil is the childish wishfulfillment of roleplaying. 

But, that doesn't mean we should throw out the baby with the bath water.  Within every childish fantasy is the seed of truth. Our longing for "God" is because awareness longs to return to its source. We conceive of "God" in monotheistic terms because mind is one mind--there is mind only--and this mind is the one true suchness as source.  Within the consciousness of humanity is the special aspect of self-consciousness inherent in the light itself.  Humans have a special relationship with the universe in being able to reopen the veil of the 8th consciousness and realize the transformation of wisdom. But it is not done by "good conquering evil" in the dramatic sense of storytelling that posits one side of the opposites can defeat the other pole of the duality, but in the awareness itself that becomes aware of the inherent unity of all opposites just as light cannot manifest without the polarization of the wave into a peak and a trough. With the direct non-cognitive awareness that the opposites of good and evil are the peak and trough of the vibration of light itself, the Dharmakaya comes to conscious realization in a self-less-consciousness and manifests the purity that transcends the duality of the pure and the impure and realizes the goodness that transcends the duality of good and evil.

Trayvon Martin killing: is the investigation by Barney Fife or Bull Connor?

One aspect of the American Brand of Fascism (TM) is that it could not exist as it does but for the exploitation of those persons holding onto the remnants of the mental-frame of White Supremacy.  One only has to look at the current Republican Presidential Nominations campaigns and debates to see how the Republicans appeal directly and indirectly to White Supremacists and those with affinity for that framing of social relations.

Fascism always has a pseudo-populist appeal by its stirring up of the us-them framing of every major issue.  Without the version of racism within the American Brand of Fascism (ABF) constellating chief features of the primal feelings of tribalism for the in-group hatred of the out-group, there could not be the successful divide and conquer approach that fascism needs in order to develop its faux-populist base.

This week has revealed only the latest disgusting example of this lingering White Supremacy that the ABF relies and thrives upon. I'm speaking of the apparent murder of Trayvon Martin, a 17 year old boy in Sanford, Florida.  This is another case of wrongful death exposing the living remnants of delusional white supremacy in the good ole USA.

Trayvon Martin was killed by a self-appointed neighborhood watch fanatic named George Zimmerman, who by all the reported facts appears to have been racially motivated in his attack upon Trayvon because he though Trayvon was from another neighborhood as he exited a convenience store. In fact, Trayvon was a part-time resident visiting his father who lived in that neighborhood, a gated community, and was leaving the store with Skittles candy and tea that he had purchased.

Always on the forefront of exposing such attrocities of our fascist system, the news program Democracy Now! devoted a special program hour on Tuesday March 20, 2012, to reviewing this event.   Included in the program is a discussion of Florida's misnamed "Stand Your Ground" law that permits people to carry concealed weapons and use them if they feel threatened.  While the facts of the Trayvon Martin murder clearly do not come under this law as the 911 calls from the killer Zimmerman show the he was not "standing his ground" but was in pursuit of Trayvon and was at the same time being told by the police on the 911 call to stand down from his pursuit. 

GEORGE ZIMMERMAN: This guy looks like he’s up to no good or he’s on drugs or something. It’s raining, and he’s just walking around, looking about.

911 DISPATCHER: OK. And this guy, is he white, black or Hispanic?

GEORGE ZIMMERMAN: He looks black.

911 DISPATCHER: Did you see what he was wearing?

GEORGE ZIMMERMAN: Yeah, a dark hoodie, like a grey hoodie, and either jeans or sweatpants and white tennis shoes.

911 DISPATCHER: Are you following him?

GEORGE ZIMMERMAN: Yeah.

911 DISPATCHER: OK, we don’t need you to do that."

Still, NRA gun lobbyists and supporters of the law are claiming that Zimmerman was somehow acting in "self defense" when he ran after Trayvon who had a pack of Skittles while Zimmerman had a hand gun.

 At the time of the recording of the program, the Florida State's Attorney office was not committing itself to charging Zimmerman and instead was making excuses for stalling the arrest.  But the Dept. of Justice by the FBI, had announced that it would review the case from a federal perspective, which was initially a noncommittal statement.

The latest news is that the State's Attorney's Office is trying to craft a "compromise" by announcing that instead of just indicting the suspect by the filing of what is called "an information" which is the usual way that suspects are arrested and charged, they will present the case to a grand jury in order for the grand jury to issue the indictment and thereby take the heat off the prosecutor's office for whatever decision is made.  This is a common method adopted for crimes with political overtones to be handled if the prosecutor has reluctance to stand up and just make the charge directly on his own responsibility. 

Why wouldn't the Florida State Attorney's office want to issue the charges on its own?   Basically it appears that they are reluctant to do the charging because of the racist elements in the office and the local police who have botched the investigation. The question that is begged by the total unprofessional and incompetent conduct of the investigation by the Sanford Police Department is was this investigation done by Barney Fife or Bull Connor?  Based on the reported facts so far, it looks like Bull to me.   I can only conclude that the police are deliberately failing to investigate seriously and that only a public outcry will create any chance of a fair inquiry if one is even possible in that location.

P.S. Here is one online petition to record your views of this tragedy and to call for a real prosecution of this hate crime.

P.P.S.  Here is The Young Turks, Cenk Uygur, reviewing this story and interviewing Turner Clayton of the Seminole County Chapter of the NAACP  providing previous examples of police failure to investigate "white on black" crime but if the roles are reversed to immediately arrest the African American suspect.    http://current.com/shows/the-young-turks/videos/local-naacp-leader-fbi-should-take-over-investigation-into-florida-shooting-of-trayvon-martin

A Zen Buddhist’s View Of The Illusion Of Corporate Personhood - 2

I previously posted Section A of Part 2 of my planned essay. Here, Section C of Part 2, is another piece of the puzzle of corporate personhood.

2. A Brief History of the Stranger Than Fiction Doctrine of Corporate Personhood

C. The Strange Case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R. Co. 

In the annals of history, both legal and lay, the case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R. Co. (1886), 118 U.S. 394, has been credited with legally establishing the court created doctrine of corporate personhood.  And because of this, Justice John Marshall Harlan, the author of the opinion has been called the father of the doctrine of corporate personhood.  The truth is stranger.  The Santa Clara case was about whether fences on the side of the tracks should be taxed by the state government or by the local counties, and thus asked the narrow legal question:  Was the assessment of the railroad companies= fences that were taxed by the state as part of the Arailway@ legal, or should the fences have been taxed by local government separately as Aother property@ improvements?  

The railroad corporations argued the state assessment was invalid because the fences were not part of the Arailway@ but were Aother property@ improvements taxable only by localities. As an alternative argument the railroads argued that the assessment was invalid because the railroad companies had not received equal protection under the 14^th Amendment since other corporations and natural persons received the Aother property@ status for local taxation. This question of “equal protection” of course is the question that was the lynch pin in the theory of corporate personhood and was the holy grail that the railroads and other corporations had been reaching for by bringing a multitude of cases to the Supreme Court.

The Federal Court of Appeal ruled on the equal protection issue in favor of the railroad and found that the railroad did indeed have the equal protection of the 14^th Amendment, and so that court never addressed the state law issues. 

When the Santa Clara case was decided by the Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote the opinion of the court.  This opinion by Justice Harlan is the only legally binding result and authority of the Santa Clara case.  But whatever judicial sins Justice Harlan may have had, Acreating@ the legal fiction of corporate personhood in his opinion in the Santa Clara case was definitely not one of them.  Justice Harlan=s opinion upheld the ruling of the trial court in favor of the railroad, but not for the 14^th Amendment reason the railroad wanted. 

Harlan found that the appellate circuit court had ruled in backwards order, because the case should have been decided on the state law basis, not on Athe grave questions of constitutional law upon which the case was determined below.@  Justice Harlan concluded, AAs the judgment can be sustained upon this ground [of state law] it is not necessary to consider any other questions raised by the pleadings and the facts found by the court.@  Thus the corporate personhood question was never even ruled upon by the Santa Clara case. In fact, the Santa Clara case specifically overruled the lower appellate court’s attempt to insert the 14^th Amendment into the case.

So how is it that this case is uniquely misunderstood in the history of law and the development of the doctrine of corporate personhood?  Simply, it was the later deliberate misrepresentation of the law by Supreme Court Justice Stephan J. Field. In the Santa Clara case, the summary minutes of the case history prepared by the court clerk states in its introduction:

AOne of the points made and discussed at length in the brief of counsel for defendants in error was that >Corporations are persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.= Before argument MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE said: The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations.  We are all of opinion that it does.@ 

However, the statement of Chief Justice Waite had absolutely no force of law as it was merely the expression of his own personal opinion before arguments even began, and was not only not incorporated into Justice Harlan’s written opinion on the case, the written opinion explicitly rejected the meaning of this comment as being part of the decision on the case.  Prior to this case there had been no Supreme Court decision that ever stated that corporations are persons within the meaning of the 14^th Amendment, and Justice Harlan’s opinion in this case specifically stated again that the Supreme Court was not making that ruling.

Thus, the doctrine of corporate personhood was not promulgated within the authoritative opinion of court hearing the Santa Clara case, but was stated only in the unauthoritative dicta (side comment) of the Chief Justice from the bench that was said even before the oral arguments had begun.  Therefore the Santa Clara case has absolutely no precedent value on the issue of corporate personhood.  There was in fact no legal reason for the court clerk to have inserted the comment into the summary of the case other than as an interesting note of history. At the time before recordings, the minutes of the comments at the hearing were the only official record of the proceedings and were attached to the opinions even though the minutes were not part of the opinions. The general and commonly acknowledged rule is that there are many comments made by Justices during oral argument, and it is beyond dispute that none of those comments have any authority or precedent and are only of value in trying to divine the reasoning behind the individual justice’s later opinion.

The Real Father of Corporate Personhood

Afterwards, even though the clerk had merely inserted some of the bench comments into the summary of the case, not the opinion of the case, the Santa Clara case became known as the original source of judicial authority on the doctrine of corporate personhood due to the intentional misrepresentation by Justice Stephen J. Field, who is the real “father of corporate personhood.”  How can it be said that Field’s misrepresentation was intentional?  As it turns out, Justice Field of the Supreme Court  was sitting on the 9^th Circuit Court of Appeals at the time of the Santa Clara case and he was the author of the appellate decision that found that corporations were persons.  In those days the Justices of the Supreme Court also served on the appellate circuit courts when not in session in Washington. Thus it was his own opinion that had been overruled by the Supreme Court in the Santa Clara case.  So there is no conceivable way that he did not know that the Santa Clara case had overruled his own appellate opinion and in doing so had specifically refused to rule on the question of corporate personhood as he had hoped it would.

Who was Justice Stephan Johnson Field?  He was a lawyer from New York who went to California in the 1848 Gold Rush.  Within three days of arriving in Marysville California, he was elected Alcade (mayor) and instituted the whipping post as a substitute for the expense of incarcerating prisoners.  He was then elected to the State Assembly in 1850 but lost reelection. He was then elected to the California Supreme Court in 1857.  While a Justice on that court, he carried two pistols in a specially made coat so that he could fire his weapons through the coat’s pockets.  From the California Supreme Court President Lincoln appointed Field to the US Supreme Court in 1863. 

Field’s career on the Supreme Court shows that he never met a corporation that he didn’t like.  As soon as the 14^th Amendment was adopted, Field began looking for ways to bring corporations into its penumbra.   It was obvious to any observer that the 14^th Amendment was originally intended to guarantee equal protection of the laws to free slaves who were now recognized to be citizens of the United States.  However, the railroads and other big corporations immediately perceived that, if the 14^th Amendment could be made to apply to corporations that were already recognized as “artificial persons” as “persons under the 14^th Amendment,” then this would be the mechanism for the legalization of their supremacy over natural persons in the realm of politics.   Field was central to the Supreme Court’s expansion of the 14^th Amendment protections for everyone, and especially including corporations, everyone that is except the originally intended recipients of the 14^th Amendment, the freed slaves and other previously subjugated minorities such as the Chinese.

Two years after the Santa Clara case, in Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining and Milling Company v. Pennsylvania (1988) 125 U.S. 181, Justice Field wrote in the majority opinion that corporations are not Acitizens@ within the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  He had to say so because a previous case had already stated this explicitly, and the Court was not about to overturn this precedent.  Field explained Athe term citizens, as used in the clause, applies only to natural persons, members of the body politic owing allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons created by the legislature, and possessing only such attributes as the legislature has prescribed.@  This is of course, if reason and logic prevailed, the same reasoning that should lead to the same conclusion regarding the question of whether a corporation is a “person” under the 14^th Amendment’s definition of persons as “persons born or naturalized in the United States.”

However, in the Pembina case, Field incredibly came to the opposite conclusion as to the term “person” in the 14^th Amendment’s next sentence and was able to do so because no other case had ruled on this question.  In a gratuitous and superfluous statement of dicta, having nothing to do with the outcome of the Pembina case, Field wrote, AUnder the designation of person there is no doubt that a private corporation is included.  Such corporations are merely associations of individuals united for a special purpose, and permitted to do business under a particular name, and have a succession of members without dissolution.@  Field provided no legal rationale whatsoever why corporations are not “citizens” since they possess only such attributes as the legislature prescribes, but are “persons” while possessing only the very same attributes.  In other words, Field was doing away with the previously vital distinction between “natural” and “artificial” in the legal fiction of a corporation’s personhood.

For the first time in a Supreme Court decision, Field was stating this new doctrine without referring at all to the Santa Clara case or to any other specific previous case to support his statement, a statement that was not even necessary and had no specific application to the case at hand.  This is the earliest case that actually states in the body of its opinion that private corporations are included as persons under the 14^th Amendment.   And of course, that holding was not even necessary because his opinion in even this case concluded that the 14^th Amendment didn=t apply to the case, even when corporations are considered as persons.  But in order give corporate personhood a foothold into case law, Field inserted the doctrine without otherwise explaining any legal basis for it.

Then finally in Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Beckwith (1889) 129 U.S. 26, issued only a year after Pembina and three years after Santa Clara, there came a case about three hogs that had been killed by a train.  Under the Iowa statute, after a hearing a justice of the peace awarded damages in favor of the farmer. The railroad then ignored the order and under the same statute the award was doubled for failure to pay.  The railroad challenged the statute saying they were denied equal protection under the 14^th Amendment because the statute only applied to railroad corporations and the double award provision was not in other statutes that applied to other types of corporations.  The railroad was claiming that they deserved equal protection because not all corporations were being treated equally under the law. 

In a legally fascinating sleight of hand, Field was able to turn this case into the watershed that the corporations were seeking. The court majority, with Field writing the opinion, found first that the 14^th Amendment applied to corporations, but that the state law in this case had not violated the 14^th Amendment because the state’s police power in enacting the law had a reasonable basis to make the law apply only to railroads and the 14^th Amendment required only that like persons were treated alike, that is, that all railroad corporations be treated alike, not that all corporations be treated alike.

Then to support his unprecedented position with precedent, Field wrote: ACorporations are persons within the meaning of the clauses in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution concerning the deprivation of property, and concerning the equal protection of the laws.  Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394, and Pembina Mining Co v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, followed.@  Of course, Field knew that Santa Clara did not make that holding and that his own opinion in Pembina didn=t even mention Santa Clara, much less follow it as precedent.  He knew as well that the reference in Pembina to corporate personhood was judicial dicta inserted by himself having no application to the ruling itself.

So it was Justice Field who singlehandedly inserted the doctrine of corporate personhood into Supreme Court opinions and exploited his false citation to Santa Clara as the source of the earliest precedent for the doctrine of corporate personhood to create a false history of corporate personhood.  Subsequently, people, including the Supreme Court in later decsions, have taken Field's false citation to the Santa Clara case as proof that the Santa Clara case is the first case that established corporate personhood as a precedent.

To date, no Supreme Court case has ever directly considered and provided the legal rationale to support the argument on the original issue of whether and why corporations are included as persons under the 14^th Amendment when the 14^th amendment only defines persons as “persons born or naturalized in the United States,”  For example, if taken at its face value, under the naked conclusion of Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Beckwith, since corporations are persons under the 14^th Amendment, corporations should be able to be elected to congress under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment that refers to persons elected to Congress.

A Zen Buddhist’s View Of The Illusion Of Corporate Personhood - 1

I'm working on an essay about the illusion of corporate personhood as viewed by the perspective of this zen student. My grand design (or delusion of grandure) is to have sections dealing with:

1. How Buddha Dharma Views The Illusion of Personality.

2. A Brief History of the Stranger Than Fiction Doctrine of Corporate Personhood
A. The Heart of the American Revolution Was a Revolt Against Corporate Political Power.
B. The Corporate Trial of Strength by the Banks and Railroads
C. The Strange Case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R. Co. (1886)
D. The Development of the Doctrine of Corporate Personhood

3. The Modern Political Power of Corporations is the American Brand of Fascism

4.  A Path to Pierce the Illusion of Corporate Personhood
A.  What Would a Real 21st Century Tea Party Revolt Against Corporate Property and Profits Look Like?
B. What is a Buddhist to Do?

This first installment is not actually what I've conceived of as the first section.  This is the first draft of the first section of Part 2. Though based on the arising inspiration, the whole thing may be rearranged when all the parts are completed.
.

2. A Brief History of the Stranger Than Fiction Doctrine of Corporate Personhood

A. The Heart of the American Revolution Was a Revolt Against Corporate Political Power.

            Because it is a perfect example of how the more things change the more they stay the same, let’s begin our story of corporate political influence with the founding of our nation.  Few people realize that the birth of the United States of America was in large part a reaction to the power of corporations at the initial stages of the development of Corporate Personhood (CP).  

            In the middle of the 18^th century there was no more powerful corporation than the East India Company of England (EIC) with its great wealth from trade specializing in cotton, silk, dyes, saltpeter, salt, tea, and opium.  Its power was so vast that it ruled over its trade territories as an autonomous pseudo-government, printing money, enforcing its laws, and claiming land in its own name.  But like the corporations of today it was not immune to the depressions of economic fortunes, and at the beginning of the 1770s it faced bankruptcy due to changes in financial conditions.  The EIC went to Parliament, and not unlike today, it’s leaders claimed that it was a corporation too big to fail and successfully sought a governmental bail out.  The bail out bill was known as the Regulating Act of 1773. 

            As a concession for bailing out the corporation, Parliament exacted acknowledgement from the EIC that any act of sovereignty that was made by the operators of the EIC as subjects of the Crown was in fact for the benefit of the sovereignty of the Crown and not in EIC’s own right.  Thus Parliament exerted its ultimate political control over the EIC, but in so doing it admitted, both in the Act and de facto, the “right” of the EIC to have influence over Parliament through the political process.  As part of the 1773 Act’s bail out program, the EIC was given both greater autonomy in its business enterprises in the American Colonies and tax relief in the form of rebates and exemptions from tea import duties that the much smaller Colonial traders were still forced to pay. 

            As the result of their bail out and tax favoritism, the EIC was able to undersell its Colonial entrepreneurial competitors to drive many of them out of business.  The response to this exercise of raw transnational corporate power was the revolt that has became known as the Boston Tea Party where the patriotic rioters destroyed the private property of the corporation by throwing the bales of tea into the salt water and ruining them.  This illegal destruction of corporation property was among the first acts of open defiance leading up to our nation’s Declaration of Independence. 

            Of course today, destroying the property of the powerful transnational corporations is still considered illegal by the political powers that be, yet no one can deny that such destruction of corporate property has a hallowed place in the shrine of American history.  It seems that today’s Tea Party adherents have completely forgotten the lesson of the original Tea Party as they fawn over the rich and powerful in the corporations who control their agenda, such as today’s Tea Party’s love of corporate controlled health care.  If it were not for the powerful corporations’ control of Colonial economics and the Colonists’ revolt against those transnational corporations, the USA might never have been born.

            It was this experience with the scope of political power of the large corporations that informed the founding fathers’ view of corporations and explains why the word “corporation” does not appear in the U.S. Constitution or Bill of Rights. The compatriots of the original Tea Party knew that corporations need to be limited in their political power and influence.  Thus, with the founding of our nation the American laws protected people from corporations in ways that other nations did not.  For example, only natural humans were considered to be the “people” who had the protection of the First Amendment for their free speech.  Only natural humans had the protection of the Fourth Amendment right to privacy.  Only natural people had the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy and the right to silence if accused of a crime.  Only natural people could be shareholders and Corporations were not allowed to be shareholders of other corporations. Corporations could not give money to politicians or try to influence elections on the rationale that they had no business doing so because they could not vote. Corporations were only chartered for specific purposes with at least a colorable claim that the purpose was “for the public good” and they were typically established for a specific term of years related to that purpose.  The requirement of a single purpose that was for the benefit of the public (such as building a bridge, operating a toll road, running a university, etc.) was far different from today’s view that the only purpose of a corporation is to make profits for its owners.

            In fact the threat of the power of corporations was so well known to the founding fathers such as Sam Adams who participated in the original Boston Tea Party, that Thomas Jefferson and James Madison apparently proposed a so-called  “11^th Amendment” that would have placed corporations into the Constitution for the purpose of a Federal restriction on their power in the manner of the other restrictions on the power of the Federal Government and making most of the above restrictions on corporations part of the Constitution. The story goes that their proposed Amendment was rejected by Congress with the help of the argument that it was not necessary to put it into the Constitution because the states already had those regulatory restrictions in place in their state laws.   

            I have not found original source material for this story of a Jefferson-Madison Amendment aimed at corporations, however, whether or not the legend of their proposal is true, it is undeniable that both Jefferson and Madison expressed clear reservations about corporations.  Jefferson said in 1816, “I hope that we shall crush ... in its birth the aristocracy of our moneyed corporations, which dare already to challenge our government to a trial of strength, and bid defiance to the laws of our country. I sincerely believe that banking establishments are more dangerous than standing armies.”  And by the end of his life, Madison’s views on corporations were equally plain as stated in a letter dated March 10, 1827, “Incorporated Companies with proper limitations and guards, may in particular cases, be useful; but they are at best a necessary evil only.”   There can be no doubt that both of these founding fathers were advocates for strong limitations and safeguards against the political power of corporations.

*****
Comments invited.